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Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this conference on the im-
portant topic of  “The Future of Global Health Governance.” I commend the 
Dean Rusk International Law Center at the University of Georgia School of Law, 
and the editors and staff of the Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 
Law, for convening this symposium to examine the response of global institu-
tions to the COVID-19 pandemic and to consider mechanisms for improving in-
ternational cooperation in the future. Participating on a panel involving so many 
esteemed colleagues is a special honor. In addition, I am especially grateful to 
my friend and health law colleague Elizabeth Weeks for the invitation to partic-
ipate in this discussion and for incorporating into this conference a consideration 
of the role that social insurance plays in mitigating the economic impacts of pan-
demic public health measures on the lives of people and families.1 The title of 
this panel—“The Role of Federal Governments in Pandemics: How Can Gov-
ernments Design Social Safety Nets to Reduce the Individual, Societal, and 
Global Impact of A Pandemic?”—recognizes the essential role of government-
guaranteed economic security in sustaining the health of individuals and popula-
tions in times of crisis, as well as normalcy. This essay will explore how social 
insurance programs in the United States serve as mechanisms to buttress public 
health and healthcare measures to smooth the disruptive vicissitudes occurring 
under contemporary economic and environmental conditions.   
Professor Ho2 concluded her presentation with the observation that the emer-
gence of the COVID-19 pandemic found a nation with inequality as its preexist-
ing condition.3 The COVID-19 pandemic exposed preexisting inequality in ac-
cess to health care and health insurance, and in income. These inequalities have 
a cascading impact resulting in inequalities in housing, food, transportation op-
tions, educational access, working conditions, environmental conditions, internet 
connectivity, and myriad other aspects of life. Concomitantly, the COVID-19 
pandemic exposed weaknesses in the existing unemployment, workers’ compen-
sation, disability insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, long-term care, and family 
leave components of this infrastructure. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic 
exposed gaps in these programs—nontraditional workers in the gig economy 
were ineligible for unemployment insurance, provision for caregiving is largely 
absent as a component of U.S. social insurance structures, the association of 
health insurance with employment left many workers vulnerable with lost jobs, 
and the administrative mechanisms through which many programs operated were 
not adequate to the high demand that COVID-19 occasioned. Some people who 
 
 1 University of Georgia Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs and Charles H. Kirbo Chair 
in Law at the School of Law. 
 2 Professor Christina S. Ho, Rutgers Law School. 
 3 Christina S. Ho, The Future of Global Health Governance: The Role of Federal Gov-
ernments in Pandemics (Jan. 25, 2021). 
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contracted COVID-19 may continue to experience effects of the disease which 
may limit their ability to work or care for their families. Finally, the COVID-19 
emergency required federal and state officials to institute measures to overcome 
longstanding barriers to health insurance coverage for delivery of healthcare ser-
vices remotely. 
This conference took place shortly after the Biden Administration assumed 
office. According to the Economic Policy Institute, the economic downturn re-
sulting from the institution of public health measures during COVID-19 affected 
25.7 million workers.4 Of that number, 11.1 million were unemployed, 7.0 mil-
lion were employed but experiencing a cut in pay and hours, 3.1 million were 
misclassified as employed or not in the labor force, and 4.5 million dropped out 
of the labor force.5 Most economists would say that the official unemployment 
measures often understate the problem because of the lag in data collection.6 
Workers also may not be captured by these surveys of unemployment because 
COVID-19 business closures classified work absence as “employed but absent 
from work” instead of “unemployed on temporary layoff.”7 
The dislocation resulting from these massive levels of unemployment is sig-
nificant. Using the Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey for December 9–21, 
2020, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) found that households 
of nearly one in five adults with children lacked sufficient food in the last seven 
days.8 Mirroring the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 virus, black and 
Latinx households were more likely to experience food insufficiency during the 
pandemic.9 Nearly one in five renters were not caught up on rent during the pan-
demic, with renters of color facing greatest hardships.10 One quarter of renters 
 
 4 What Economy Will President-Elect Biden Inherit?, ECON. POL’Y INST., 
https://www.epi.org/multimedia/what-economy-will-president-elect-biden-inherit/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2021). 
 5 See Shahar Ziv, Don’t Be Fooled by Official Unemployment Rate of 14.7%; The Real 
Figure is Even Scarier, FORBES (May 10, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shahar-
ziv/2020/05/10/dont-be-fooled-by-official-unemployment-rate-of-147-the-real-figure-is-
even-scarier/?sh=19bb375d55dd. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rate Is Higher Than Officially Recorded, More So for 
Women and Certain Other Groups, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 30, 2020), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2020/06/30/unemployment-rate-is-higher-than-officially-recorded-
more-so-for-women-and-certain-other-groups/. 
 8 CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, Tracking the COVID-19 Recession’s Effects on 
Food, Housing, and Employment Hardships, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-in-
equality/tracking-the-covid-19-recessions-effects-on-food-housing-and (last updated Mar. 22, 
2021). The Census Bureau began a new experimental Household Pulse Survey to collect and 
use data on how the coronavirus pandemic affected people’s lives in April 2020. The data 
presented here are the data available at the time of the conference. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
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living with children were not caught up on rent.11 More than one-third of adults 
surveyed had trouble paying for usual household expenses in the last week.12 Job 
losses were largest in low-wage industries. The unemployment rate dispropor-
tionately affected women, immigrants, young adults, and less educated work-
ers.13 
These effects of the COVID-19 recession layered disruption on a society char-
acterized by economic inequality.14 Research based on the census found that the 
top 20% of earners with incomes of $130,001 or more in 2018 captured more 
than 50% of all U.S. income.15 This Pew Research Center report found that in-
come inequality in the United States is the highest of all G7 nations.16 Income 
gaps between Black and white people have also persisted in recent decades, with 
median Black household income being 61% of white household income in 
2018.17 From 1989 to 2016, the wealth gap between the nation’s wealthiest and 
poorest families more than doubled, and, since the Great Recession, only families 
with a median net worth in the top 20% increased their wealth between 2007 and 
2016.18 Finally, middle-class incomes have not grown at the same rate as have 
upper-tier incomes.19 
Median household incomes continue to vary by race and ethnicity even though 
incomes for all households increased in 2019.20 Median household incomes in 
2019 were as follows: $98,174 for Asian American households, $76,057 for 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Claire Zippel, Latest Data: Nearly 1 in 3 Adults Having Trouble Paying Expenses, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/latest-data-1-in-3-
adults-having-trouble-paying-expenses. 
 13 Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of Covid-19 Than in 
Two Years of the Great Recession, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2020), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-covid-19-
than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/. 
 14 See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 192 (2006) (cautioning that setting Americans 
adrift, unmoored from the protection against economic risks that equitable social insurance 
programs provide, posed “a threat to our nation’s future, and to the vision of America that 
generations of Americans have held dear”). 
 15 Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-
inequality-in-the-u-s/. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. (finding that from 1970 to 2018, middle-class incomes increased 49% whereas up-
per-level incomes increased 64% during that time and the share of adults who live in middle-
income households decreased from 61% to 51% between 1971 to 2019). 
 20 Valerie Wilson, Racial Disparities in Income and Poverty Remain Largely Unchanged 
Amid Strong Income Growth in 2019, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 16, 2020, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-in-income-and-poverty-remain-largely-un-
changed-amid-strong-income-growth-in-2019. 
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white households, $56,113 for Hispanic households, $46,073 for Black house-
holds.21 Job losses due to the pandemic have significantly undercut these income 
levels, with job losses disproportionately affecting Black and Hispanic work-
ers.22 Poverty rates also are unequal when analyzed by race: 18.7% for Blacks, 
15.7% for Hispanics, 7.3% for Asian Americans, and 7.3% for whites.23 
Existing social insurance programs mitigate poverty among the beneficiary 
populations. The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has ap-
proximately 8.2 million beneficiaries, plus 1.4 million children.24 The average 
amount of benefits is $1100 per month or $13,200 per year.25 Most beneficiaries, 
especially people who are not married, rely on SSDI for most of their income.26 
These modest benefit payments represented “at least half of total family income 
for” 47% of beneficiaries in 2010, and 20% of beneficiaries relied on benefits for 
90% or more of their income.27 For 71% of unmarried beneficiaries, SSDI ben-
efits represent half or more of annual income.28 
Approximately 8 million people, including 1.1 million children, rely on the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for support, with more than half 
receiving the basic monthly benefit of $794 per month in 2021—approximately 
 
 21 Id. For comparison, the 2021 Federal Poverty Guidelines for the 48 contiguous states 
and the District of Columbia specify an income level of $26,500 for a family of four. 2021 
Poverty Guidelines, OFF. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Jan. 26, 2021), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/2021-poverty-guidelines. 
 22 Valerie Wilson, Racial Disparities in Income and Poverty Remain Largely Unchanged 
Amid Strong Income Growth in 2019, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 16, 2020, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-in-income-and-poverty-remain-largely-un-
changed-amid-strong-income-growth-in-2019. 
 23 Id. (“The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), an alternative to the long-running of-
ficial poverty measure, provides an even more accurate measure of a household’s economic 
vulnerability.”) In addition to capturing before-tax cash income, the SMP also considers non-
cash benefits and tax credits, and takes into account geographic variations in the cost of living. 
Compared to the SMP, the official poverty measure understates poverty among all groups 
except for Blacks where the measures are very close. 
 24 Chart Book: Social Security Disability Insurance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/chart-book-social-security-
disability-insurance. 
 25 Chart Book: Social Security Disability Insurance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/chart-book-social-security-
disability-insurance. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Melissa M. Favreault, Richard W. Johnson, and Karen E. Smith, How Important is So-
cial Security Disability Insurance to U.S. Workers?, at 4–5, Urban Institute, June 2013, 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23731/412847-how-important-is-social-
security-disability-insurance-to-u-s-workers-.pdf. 
 28 Id. 
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three-quarters of the federal poverty line.29 SSI beneficiaries also have access to 
the Medicaid programs.30   
The Social Security retirement benefit provides the majority of income to most 
elderly Americans.31 For half of seniors, it provides at least 50% of their income 
and for about 25%, it provides at least 90% of income.32 In June 2020, the aver-
age monthly benefit was $1514—about $18,170 per year.33 With this modest 
level of benefits, adequacy is an issue and a concern exacerbated for workers 
who have to claim benefits before the full retirement age because they can no 
longer find work or because they work in physically demanding jobs which they 
can no longer perform.34 As a percentage of earnings, Social Security benefits in 
the United States rank just outside of the bottom third of OECD countries.35 
Despite these trends in inequality and economic vulnerability, recent govern-
ment policies and proposals tended toward deregulation and the undermining of 
social insurance, health care, and other programs that provide economic support 
and opportunity for “ordinary citizens.”36 Among the examples of a weak 
 
 29 Policy Basics, Supplemental Security Income, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 




eral poverty level in 2021 for a one-person household is $12,880 per year—or approximately 
$1074 per month. 
 30 Id. Introduction to the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-the-supplemental-secu-
rity-income-ssi-program (last updated Feb. 27, 2014). 
 31 Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/top-ten-facts-
about-social-security. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. Kathy Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance is Vital to Workers With Severe 
Impairments, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.cbpp.org/re-
search/social-security-disability-insurance-is-vital-to-workers-with-severe-impairments; Eric 
Kingson & Monique Morrissey, Can Workers Offset Social Security Cuts by Working 
Longer?, ECON. POL’Y INST., at 1 (May 30, 2012), https://files.epi.org/2012/bp343-social-se-
curity-retirement-age.pdf. See also Press Release, National Academy of Social Insurance, 
Task Force on Older Workers Launches at the National Academy of Social Insurance (Feb. 
22, 2021), https://www.nasi.org/press/releases/2021/02/task-force-older-workers-launches-
national-academy-social (“We are delighted to continue partnering with the [National Acad-
emy of Social Insurance] to identify effective strategies to support older workers who can no 
longer continue in jobs that are physically demanding or because their health has declined,” 
said Debra Whitman, Executive Vice President and Chief Public Policy Officer at AARP). 
 35 Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/top-ten-facts-
about-social-security. 
 36 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, LET THEM EAT TWEETS: HOW THE RIGHT RULES IN 
AN AGE OF EXTREME INEQUALITY 56, 59, 164–66 (2020). Eric Kingson & Monique Morrissey, 
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commitment to crucial government supports for lower-income families are pro-
posals to replace Social Security with private investment accounts, the failure of 
a dozen states to adopt the Medicaid expansion, state requests for waivers to 
condition Medicaid benefits on work requirements, proposals to tighten eligibil-
ity for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or food stamp bene-
fits, and contentious and divergent views about the size and nature of continued 
relief to ameliorate the effects of the pandemic.37   
 
Can workers offset Social Security cuts by working longer?, ECON. POL’Y INST., at 1 (May 30, 
2012), https://files.epi.org/2012/bp343-social-security-retirement-age.pdf (characterizing the 
raising of the eligibility age for full Social Security retirement benefits from 65 to 67 as a 
benefit cut and proposals to raise the age of full retirement further as “another benefit cut that 
would impose significant additional hardship on many older workers”); Frank J. Thompson, 
Six Ways Trump Has Sabotaged the Affordable Care Act, BROOKINGS (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/10/09/six-ways-trump-has-sabotaged-the-af-
fordable-care-act/ (describing reductions in outreach to promote insurance enrollment, reduc-
tions in subsidies to insurance companies, making it possible for people to purchase lower 
quality health insurance, promoting waivers, discouraging legal noncitizen immigrants from 
enrolling in Medicaid by characterizing it as a negative factor in immigration status decisions, 
and, along with numerous states, pursing a constitutional challenge to the validity of the ACA); 
Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: An Interactive Map, KFF (Apr. 13, 2021), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-inter-
active-map/ (noting that twelve states have failed to adopt the Medicaid expansion available 
through the ACA); Dorothy Rosenbaum & Zoë Neuberger, President’s 2021 Budget Would 
Cut Food Assistance for Millions and Radically Restructure SNAP, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, 1 (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-18-
20fa.pdf (describing proposed cuts through the budget process and regulatory action to Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) with impact on unemployed workers, elderly 
individuals, people with disabilities, and low-income working families with children). 
 37  Henry J. Aaron, Privatizing Social Security: A Bad Idea Whose Time Will Never Come, 
BROOKINGS (June 1, 1997), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/privatizing-social-security-a-
bad-idea-whose-time-will-never-come/ (stating that proposals to allow private savings ac-
counts to replace all or part of Social Security retirement programs would shift the risk to the 
worker); Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: An Interactive Map, KFF (June 7, 
2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-deci-
sions-interactive-map/ (noting that twelve states have failed to adopt the Medicaid expansion 
available through the ACA); MaryBeth Musumechi, Medicaid Work Requirements at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, KFF (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/medicaid-work-re-
quirements-at-u-s-supreme-court/ (documenting state requests for federal approval to condi-
tion Medicaid eligibility on work requirements); Dottie Rosenbaum & Zoë Neuberger, Presi-
dent’s 2021 Budget Would Cut Food Assistance for Millions and Radically Restructure SNAP, 
CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/presidents-2021-budget-would-cut-food-assistance-for-millions-and (describing 
Trump administration proposing budget cuts in SNAP funding and restructuring eligibility to 
exclude many families). The Biden administration curtailed plans to implement these program 
cuts. See, e.g., Aimee Picchi, USDA Drops Trump Plan to Cut Food Stamps for 700,000 Amer-
icans, CBS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/food-stamps-work-require-
ment-trump-rule-abandoned/; Luke Broadwater & Jim Tankersley, Republicans Pitch Biden 
on Smaller Aid Plan as Democrats Prepare to Act Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021), 
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As the income levels presented earlier indicate, work often does not secure an 
adequate living. The increasing globalization of labor markets creates instability. 
Similarly, the nature of work is evolving, weakening the employer-employee re-
lationship. Many workers are classified as independent contractors, have only 
contingent work arrangements with time-limited work and irregular and unpre-
dictable schedules, and must rely on online labor platforms.38 These work ar-
rangements expose workers to risks that create economic vulnerability. Risks in-
clude income risk due to the loss of access, inadequacy, or volatility of income; 
health risk due to the lack of employer-based insurance—mitigated by the pro-
visions of the Affordable Care Act; retirement risk because of the absence of 
private pensions and nonparticipation in the Social Security system; unemploy-
ment risk; injury risk because of no access to workers’ compensation benefits; 
tax compliance risk; and the lack of paid leave for health or caregiving, or other 
reasons.39 To be economically secure, individuals and families need to be pro-
tected from these vicissitudes in the lifespan.40 
The job loss and disruption brought about by the public health measures im-
posed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic expose the preexisting weaknesses 
in the social insurance infrastructure and the weak consensus about the role of 
government in addressing the impacts of this type of disruption, or those effects 
caused by environmental or other disasters. Responses in the United States and 
Europe have differed.41 This country’s unemployment insurance system, like the 
public health surveillance system, has been plagued by underinvestment and in-
consistencies because of the key role states play in the system.42 Responses are 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/us/politics/republicans-biden-coronavirus-stimu-
lus.html (“A coalition of 10 Republican senators took a stimulus counterproposal to the White 
House on Monday evening, urging President Biden to scale back his ambitions for a sweeping 
$1.9 trillion pandemic aid package in favor of a plan less than one-third the size . . . .”). 
 38 See NAT. ACAD. OF SOC. INS., REPORT TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP AND THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND INEQUALITY [HEREINAFTER, REPORT TO THE NEW 
LEADERSHIP] 186–94 (Benjamin W. Veghte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.nasi.org/sites/de-
fault/files/research/Report_to_New_Leadership_and_American_People_web.pdf (discussing 
the challenges nonstandard work create for workers). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 194. 
 41 Steven Erlanger, Who Will Recover Faster From the Virus? Europe or the U.S.?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/coronavirus-eu-
rope-usa.html. The author takes note of “the flexible nature of the American economy, quick 
both to fire workers but also to hire them again. Europe, with built-in social insurance, tries to 
keep workers from layoffs through subsidies to employers, making it harder to fire and more 
expensive to rehire.” In addition, the article identifies “Europe’s existing social welfare sys-
tem” with “[i]ts ‘automatic stabilizers’” that “kick in to support the poor and unemployed, 
without the need, as in the United States, to pass ad hoc legislation”). 
 42 Federal Neglect Leaves State Unemployment Systems in State of Disrepair, NAT’L EMP. 
LAW PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.nelp.org/publication/federal-neglect-leaves-state-
unemployment-systems-in-a-state-of-disrepair/; REPORT TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP, supra note 
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not nimble in a crisis because congressional authorization is required to extend 
the duration of benefits, extend benefits to workers who do not qualify because 
of their work status, make one-time payments to individuals, increase access to 
paid leave, and provide payroll subsidies to employers.43 At the time of the con-
ference, Congress had enacted two pandemic relief measures44 and was consid-
ering a third piece of legislation since enacted.45 The temporary nature of these 
measures creates uncertainty because the public cannot rely on the assistance to 
continue for the duration of the economic disruption. Finally, the application pro-
cess for employers seeking assistance was onerous and not transparent, causing 
delays and exacerbating disparities.46 
In contrast, European countries have focused on maintaining employment, 
which avoids the long-term consequences of losing a job.47 Some of these coun-
tries have automatic triggers for unemployment assistance, so no delay occurs 
while legislatures authorize relief. The replacement amount of unemployment 
insurance is higher—60% compared to 50% in the United States.48 The provision 
for universal health insurance meant that one less issue had to be addressed in 
 
38, at 128–30, https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Report_to_New_Leader-
ship_and_American_People_web.pdf. 
 43 REPORT TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP, supra note 38, at 118–23, https://www.nasi.org/ 
sites/default/files/research/Report_to_New_Leadership_and_American_People_web.pdf. 
 44 Pub. L. No. 116-136, Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES 
Act) (2020) (March 27, 2020); Pub. L. No. 116-260 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. 
 45 Pub. L. No. 117-2, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Mar. 11, 2021). 
 46 Stacy Cowley & Emily Flitter, Frenzy and Desperation as Small Businesses Grab for 
Government Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/busi-
ness/sba-loans-coronavirus.html; Emily Cochrane, House Overwhelmingly Approves Revi-
sions to Small Business Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/house-paycheck-protection-program-changes.html (“Since 
its inception, the Paycheck Protection Program has been plagued by problems and contro-
versy.”); Emily Flitter, Black Business Owners Had a Harder Time Getting Federal Aid, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/business/paycheck-
protection-program-bias.html. 
 47 Steven Erlanger, Who Will Recover Faster From the Virus? Europe or the U.S.?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 1, 2020),  https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/coronavirus-eu-
rope-usa.html; Peter S. Goodman, Patricia Cohen, and Rachel Chaundler, European Workers 
Draw Paychecks. American Workers Scrounge for Food., N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/business/economy/europe-us-jobless-corona-
virus.html. 
 48 Heather Long & Andrew Van Dam, As U.S. Unemployment Soared, Germany’s Barely 
Budged. Is America’s Safety Net Enough?, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/13/germany-unemployment/ (noting a benefit to “the Ger-
man model is that it kicked in swiftly and automatically” and that during the pandemic, tem-
porary benefits in the United States and Germany raised the replacement rates of 
unemployment insurance to higher levels); see also Eduardo Porter, How the American Un-
employment System Failed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021),  https://www.ny-
times.com/2021/01/21/business/economy/unemployment-insurance.html. 
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the crisis. German and French recovery plans are for ten years—not the short-
term approach that the United States has taken.49 The pay gap between college-
educated and less-educated workers since 1980 had not increased in Germany, 
unlike the preexisting condition of increasing inequality which was the situation 
in the United States at the start of the crisis.50   
The lack of consensus in the United States about what role the government 
should play in responding to the health and economic crises of the COVID-19 
pandemic reflects a historical divide. Two competing visions characterized the 
founding—a belief that energetic government at the federal and state levels 
would propel the nation’s prosperity competed with a distrust of a strong national 
government, conceding to only the minimal level of government power neces-
sary for a functioning economy and foreign policy.51 In the early days of govern-
ment, the Federalists were proponents of robust federal power under the Consti-
tution. The Anti-Federalists and their successors sought to limit the reach of 
federal power, leaving most governing to the states and the economy in the con-
trol of private actors.52 The contemporary major political parties have replicated 
this dichotomy, with Democrats advocating for a more active government role 
in ensuring access to health care and other forms of economic security and Re-
publicans resisting a robust role for the federal government, defaulting to the 
states and relying on private markets. 
The history of the nation’s social insurance infrastructure reflects these over-
arching theories about the role of government. In his comprehensive work A His-
tory of American Law, Lawrence M. Friedman identifies the roots of the modern 
 
 49 Heather Long & Andrew Van Dam, As U.S. Unemployment Soared, Germany’s Barely 
Budged. Is America’s Safety Net Enough?, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/13/germany-unemployment/ (quoting Simeon Djankov, 
senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and former finance minister 
of Bulgaria, on the uncertainty resulting from the temporary nature of pandemic aid measures 
in the United States: “The German and French recovery plans are for 10 years. In the U.S., the 
initiatives have been temporary.”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey & Jane S. Schacter, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 
4, 8 (6th ed. 2019). 
 52 Early cases like McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden reflect the divide. See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (preventing a state from taxing a federal bank); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (discussing Congress’s right to regulate navigation under 
the Commerce Clause). This divide became more pronounced in the pre-New Deal era cases 
invalidating federal attempts to regulate hours, wages, and conditions of work to produce 
goods that would enter the stream of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (disallowing labor laws as interfering with an individual’s right to contract  
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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welfare system in the poor laws of the colonies.53 Descended from laws of Eliz-
abethan England with the same label, colonial law established a system of “dis-
criminat[ing] against unfortunate strangers.”54 New England towns would 
“warn[] out” new arrivals to disclaim any responsibility if the newcomer fell on 
hard times and to place “the burden of support back on the former place of set-
tlement.”55 After independence, this practice continued, fixing responsibility on 
local government units for maintaining their own poor.56 Friedman notes that 
some argued that relief for the poor only encouraged idleness—that such assis-
tance indulges the idleness of the apocryphal “sturdy beggar,” presaging current 
reservations of some about enhanced unemployment benefits during the COVID-
19 pandemic57 private charity from church groups, extended family, and friends 
provided inadequate relief for “the helpless.”58   
By the nineteenth century, the federal government established a tradition of 
disaster relief, and “[t]he general public, like Congress, tended to be relatively 
generous to sufferers who were socially defined as blameless—the sick, the old, 
the deaf and dumb, the insane,” but the pauper, particularly the stranger, “had no 
such claim on public sympathy.”59 Some thought relief laws should be punitive 
to make poverty unpalatable.60 
Fast forward to the twentieth century, and the federal policy took a big leap 
ahead in providing programs to help vulnerable populations with the enactment 
of the Social Security Act in 1935, which created the familiar pension plan for 
 
 53 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 49–50 (3d ed. 2007); see also 
Renée M. Landers, Race (and Other Vulnerabilities) in Healthcare and Administrative Law, 
YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (September 1, 2020) https://www.yalejreg.com/ 
nc/race-and-other-vulnerabilities-in-healthcare-and-administrative-law-by-renee-m-landers/ 
(discussing previous treatment of the history of social insurance and support programs). 
 54 FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 50. 
 55 Id. This idea of tying assistance to the former place of residence appeared in the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (informally known as 
the Clinton-era welfare restructuring statute) which purported to authorize states to limit wel-
fare benefits for new residents to the level of the benefits to which the residents would be 
entitled in the state from which they had moved for one year. In reviewing a challenge to a 
California law embodying this practice, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the concept as a 
violation of the right to travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 56 FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 150. 
 57 Id. Contemporary popular culture uses this trope of the “sturdy beggar.” For example, 
PBS airs a British comedy called “Keeping Up Appearances” with a character, Onslow, who 
resides in council housing and occupies himself by watching racing on television, while his 
frustrated wife brings him the occasional beer. Keeping Up Appearances (BBC One 1990-
1995). Onslow prides himself on being “bone idle.” See, e.g., Keeping Up Appearances, 
QUOTES.NET, https://www.quotes.net/movies/keeping_up_appearances_103697 (“I’m work-
shy, bone-idle, and out of condition!”) (last visited May 27, 2021). 
 58 FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 150. 
 59 Id. at 151. 
 60 Id. at 152. 
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senior citizens and other programs to help people with vision impairment and 
other disabilities.61 In the 1960s assistance expanded significantly with the crea-
tion of the Medicare program to provide health care to persons over 65 and peo-
ple with disabilities, and the Medicaid program to serve low-income people—
signature accomplishments of President Lyndon Johnson.62   
This brief and telescoped history of social insurance and welfare programs 
offers an explanation for current exclusions of “the other” from government pro-
tection and investment. In addition to the “stranger” or “new arrival,” the “other” 
has long included people of color, people who do not conform to conventional 
sex-role stereotypes, and the noncitizen immigrant.63 Today’s racially disparate 
income inequalities and disparities in health care and health status due to race, 
gender, and other characteristics are among the predictable results of this history. 
The disparate impact of the COVID-19 crisis on communities of color has sharp-
ened the focus on the health inequities, income disparities, and myriad other so-
cial determinants of health, such as lack of access to quality education, housing, 
transportation, healthy food, and healthy environment that stunt the potential of 
people of color.64 
The Social Security Act of 1935 famously excluded about half the workers in 
the American economy from coverage—notably agricultural and domestic work-
ers—a large percentage of whom were African Americans.65 Scholars debate 
whether the exclusions of these categories of workers reflected racial animus or 
a concern for avoiding administrative complexity.66 Regardless of the motiva-
tion, the disparate impact on Black workers reduced their access to retirement 
benefits available to other workers for some time. Amendments to the statute in 
the 1950s extended coverage to some among these categories of workers.67   
 
 61 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub.L. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620, enacted August 14, 1935, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301-1305 (Suppl. 4 1934). 
 62 Friedman, supra note 53, at 508. 
 63 Landers, supra note 53. 
 64 See generally Bethany Cole, The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Access to 
Health Care, Health Policy Brief no. 17, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS. (July 2020), 
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Brief%20-%20Pandemic’s%20Im-
pact%20on%20Access%20to%20Care.pdf (describing the impact of the pandemic on health 
care and on the social determinants of health); see also AHANA Alumni Advisory Council Ra-
cial Disparities and COVID-19, B.C. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/of-
fices/alumni/sites/ahana-alumni-advisory-council/events.html (panel discussion examining 
the disparate impact of the pandemic on people of color). 
 65 Larry DeWitt, The Decision to Exclude Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 
1935 Social Security Act, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL. 49, 49 (2010). 
 66 Id. 
 67 William J. Nelson, Employment Covered Under the Social Security Program, 1935-84, 
48 SOC. SEC. BULL. 33, 34 (1985), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n4/v48n4p33.pdf. 
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Social Security reduces overall poverty rates among individuals over age 65.68  
Without Social Security, 38% would live in poverty, but including Social Secu-
rity income, the level drops to 10%.69 The racial disparity in retirement wealth 
remains substantial. Among people in that age group, 7% of Whites, 19.5% of 
Latinos, and 19% of Blacks face poverty.70 Even with access to Social Security, 
these disparities persist because people of color are more likely to work in low-
wage jobs with little opportunity for savings and to participate in private pension 
programs.71 Pointing out these disparities is a critique of the continued racial 
disparities in employment opportunities and the statutory design of Social Secu-
rity, perhaps enabled by weak administrative enforcement in employment and 
related areas. The role of the agency in producing data is essential to identifying 
the problems and proposing policies to address the disparities. Eliminating the 
payroll taxes that fund the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds as former 
President Trump proposed in the guise of pandemic relief is not among the ways 
to address these problems.72 
The Medicaid program makes provision for access to healthcare for low-in-
come populations. Originally, it covered only the aged, blind, persons perma-
nently and totally disabled, and caretakers of dependent children.73 Later, preg-
nant women and all low-income children were added.74 These eligibility criteria 
reflected historical efforts to identify the “deserving” or “worthy” poor.75 The 
ACA expanded Medicaid coverage to include all low-income persons having in-
comes less than or equal to 138% of the federal poverty line—the expansion 
population.76 The concept was to require states to expand their participation in 
the Medicaid program to include all low-income populations and to establish the 
principle that merely being poor was sufficient to qualify for government help. 
The Supreme Court famously ruled in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, however, that conditioning the traditional Medicaid payments 
to states on coverage of the expansion population was unconstitutionally 
 
 68 Policy Basics, Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/top-ten-facts-
about-social-security (“Fact #6: Social Security Lifts Millions of Elderly Americans Out of 
Poverty.”) 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. (“Fact # 8: Social Security is Particularly Important for People of Color.”) 
 71 Id. 
 72 Alan Rappeport, White House Wants Companies to Foot Payroll Tax Bill for Workers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/us/politics/trump-payroll-
tax-coronavirus.html. 
 73 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND Finance 443 
(8th ed. 2018) [hereinafter Furrow, et al.]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 David Orentlicher, Medicaid at 50: No Longer Limited to the “Deserving” Poor?, 
15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 185, 185 (2015). 
 76 Furrow, et al., supra note 73, at 446. 
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coercive.77 As a result of making adoption of the expansion optional, to date, 
twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia have expanded, seven states 
have expanded with a waiver—more on that shortly—three recently adopted ex-
pansions through a ballot initiative, and twelve states have not expanded.78 The 
states that have not expanded include Texas and the southern states east of it, 
except for Louisiana and Arkansas, as well as Kansas, South Dakota, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming.79 Studies show that the Medicaid expansion improves access to 
care, affordability of care, and financial security among low-income popula-
tions.80 Many states that did not adopt the expansion have some of the highest 
populations of Blacks and Hispanics in the country and some of the poorest 
measures on general population health.81 While the Families First Coronavirus 
Response Act contains a provision for a 6.2% increase in federal Medicaid fund-
ing for qualifying states and federal support for other COVID-19 expenditures, 
the disruption and increase in the Medicaid population due to unemployment will 
outstrip these appropriations.82 
Nationally, the Medicaid population is 41% White, 20% Black, 30% Hispanic, 
4% Asian/American or Pacific Islander, and 1% Native American.83 The 2019 
Census figures for the total population indicate that nationally, Whites comprise 
76.3%, Blacks 13.4%, Native Americans 1.3%, Asian Americans 5.9%, Native 
Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders 0.2%, Hispanic or Latino 18.5%, and non-Hispanic 
Whites 60.1%.84 These statistics mean that although Whites comprise a majority 
of Medicaid recipients, Blacks and Hispanics are overrepresented in the 
 
 77 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580, 585 (2012). 
 78 Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: An Interactive Map, KFF (Apr. 13, 
2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-deci-
sions-interactive-map/ (noting that twelve states have failed to adopt the Medicaid expansion 
available through the ACA). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Trudy Liberman, Even as COVID-19 Rages, Some States Refuse to Expand Medicaid 




 81 Jesse Cross-Call and Matt Broaddus, States That Have Expanded Medicaid Are Better 
Positioned to Address COVID-19and Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 
14, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/states-that-have-expanded-medicaid-are-
better-positioned-to-address-covid-19-and. 
 82 Cole, supra note 64. 
 83 Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-distribution-nonelderly-by-
raceethnicity/. 
 84 Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ta-
ble/US/PST045219. 
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Medicaid population in relation to their representation in the population as a 
whole.85 Of course, these percentages vary considerably by state, consistent with 
the composition of a state’s population. For example, in Iowa, 70% of Medicaid 
recipients are White, 11% are Black, and 12% are Hispanic.86 In Arkansas, 61% 
are White, 24% Black, and 10% Hispanic.87 The Alabama Medicaid population 
is 46% White, 43% Black, and 7% Hispanic.88 In Massachusetts, 47% are White, 
12% are Black, and 30% are Hispanic.89 Approximately 4% of the population, 
or 11.4 million people, are undocumented immigrants who are ineligible for 
Medicaid or any other federal public health program, except emergency care.90 
Other lawfully present immigrants also are not eligible or qualified to receive 
Medicaid and other federal benefits.91 This absence of resources is a threat to the 
entire country when a highly communicable disease is circulating.92 
State Medicaid programs exhibit a great deal of variation. Additionally, the 
Medicaid statute makes a provision for states to apply for waivers from certain 
program elements for demonstration projects.93 States have used waivers to ex-
periment with different coverage options, financing, and delivery reforms.94 The 
statute authorizes the Secretary to approve “any experimental, pilot, or demon-
stration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in pro-
moting the objectives” of Medicaid.95 During the Trump administration, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services in HHS approved state requests to 
 
 85 Compare these overall population statistics with statistics on racial distribution of Med-
icaid population supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Race/Ethnicity, FY 2019, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-distribution-nonel-
derly-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Loca-
tion%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited May 27, 2021). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the 
United States, January 2015, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. POPULATION ESTIMATES, 1 (Jan. 
2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/Pop_Esti-
mate/UnauthImmigrant/unauthorized_immigrant_population_estimates_2015_-_2018.pdf. 
 91 Tanya Broder, Avideh Moussavian, and Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant Eli-
gibility for Federal Programs, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. 1–4, (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-
09.pdf (describing relationship between immigration status and eligibility for federal benefit 
programs). According to a recent study, “[a]pproximately 5 million undocumented immigrants  
were uninsured in 2017.” Report to the New Leadership, supra note 38, at 20. 
 92 See Liberman, supra note 80. 
 93 Furrow et al., supra note 73, at 447–49. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2014). 
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attach work requirements to the eligibility criteria for Medicaid.96 The notion of 
work requirements echoes the efforts since colonial times to ensure that public 
support is not expended on the “sturdy beggar,” “the able-bodied adult,” or the 
freeloader who just chooses not to maintain gainful employment. In February 
2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Gresham v. Azar invalidated the waiver approved by HHS Secretary Alex Azar 
which authorized Arkansas to impose work requirements.97 The court ruled that 
work requirements were inconsistent with the primary purpose of the Medicaid 
statute.98 The statute provides that the purpose of Medicaid is: 
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with de-
pendent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, 
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other ser-
vices to help such families and individuals attain or retain capa-
bility for independence or self-care. . . .99 
The HHS letter approving the Arkansas waiver identified three objectives that 
Secretary Azar asserted Arkansas Works would promote: improving health out-
comes; addressing behavioral and social factors that influence health outcomes; 
and incentivizing beneficiaries to engage in their own health care and achieve 
better health outcomes.100 The approval letter opined that the Arkansas commu-
nity engagement requirements would encourage beneficiaries to obtain and 
maintain employment or other activities that correlate with improved health and 
wellness.101   
In an opinion by Judge Sentelle, the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the agency’s 
argument that the Secretary’s discretion in granting waivers was unreviewable, 
citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe102 and Department of 
Commerce v. New York103 for the proposition that the APA “exception from ju-
dicial review for an action committed to agency discretion is ‘very narrow.’”104 
The court stated that the Medicaid statute reflected Congress’s clear purpose to 
provide health care coverage, and that under Chevron, the agency was required 
 
 96 Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-
waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/. 
 97 Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 98 Id. 
 99 42 U.S.C § 1396-1 (1984). 
 100 Gresham, 950 F.3d at 97. 
 101 Id. at 103–02. 
 102 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
 103 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019). 
 104 Gresham, 950 F.3d at 98. 
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to give “effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”105 The opin-
ion rejected an effort to characterize the Secretary’s approval as helping the Med-
icaid population gain financial resources to purchase insurance as a “post hoc 
rationalization” citing Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co.106 
The final part of the court’s opinion concluded that the approvals of the Ar-
kansas work requirements were arbitrary and capricious for failure to address 
important aspects of the problem, again relying on State Farm.107 Here, the court 
noted the agency’s failure to account for loss of coverage as “a matter of im-
portance under the statute.”108 About 25% of persons subject to work require-
ments lost coverage in five months.109 The court noted that while “it is not arbi-
trary or capricious to prioritize one statutorily identified objective over another, 
it is an entirely different matter to prioritize non-statutory objectives to the ex-
clusion of the statutory purpose.”110 Efforts to condition Medicaid eligibility on 
work requirements that Congress did not authorize continues the four-hundred-
year-old practice of trying to reserve government support for the worthy poor.   
The linked economic and health crises of the pandemic coupled with the racial 
reckoning engendered by police killings of people of color provide an oppor-
tunity to reexamine existing practices across many public policy realms. These 
crises especially call upon the country to reinforce the social insurance infra-
structure so that it provides adequate economic security in ordinary times, and to 
ensure that it rises to the occasion to support people in times of crisis. The re-
cently enacted stimulus legislation, the American Rescue Plan Act, 111 contains 
the seeds for larger reform. Signed by President Biden on March 11, 2021, the 
COVID-19 stimulus builds upon many of the measures in the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act)112 from March 2020 and in 
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021113 from December 2020.   
The American Rescue Plan Act provides $1400 stimulus checks to individuals 
making under $75,000 and $1400 per dependent.114 People with incomes above 
 
 105 Gresham, 950 F.3d at 100 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
 106 Id. at 101 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)) 
 107 Id. at 102 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 108 Gresham, 950 F.3d at 103. 
 109 Id. at 102–03. 
 110 Id. at 104. 
 111 American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 247. 
 112 CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). 
 113 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 116-260 (2021). 
 114 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 6428B (providing 2021 recovery rebates to individuals). 
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$80,000 receive no payment.115 The law continues the $300-per-week increase 
in unemployment benefits.116 Other provisions increase tax subsidies for insur-
ance under the Affordable Care Act and provide subsidies for COBRA exten-
sions of health insurance for workers who become unemployed.117 In addition, 
the bill temporarily expands the child tax credit from a maximum of $2000 per 
child to $3600 for children up to age 5 and as much as $3000 for children 6 to 
17.118  Low-income people who are currently not eligible for any part of the credit 
would receive the full value of the credit.119 In the second half of 2021, the fed-
eral government will send advance payments of the credit in installments.120 The 
advance payments would serve as a form of guaranteed income for families with 
children.121   
Among the cities in the United States that are experimenting with payments 
to families to increase their incomes are Stockton, California and Chelsea, Mas-
sachusetts.122 The Stockton demonstration began in 2019 and has made payments 
of $500 per month to 125 randomly selected families.123 A recent study found 
that the Stockton payments reduced income volatility, that families tended to 
spend the money on essentials, and that recipients were able to handle unex-
pected expenses better, to pay down their debts, and help friends and relatives.124 
 
 115 Pub. L. No. 177-2, § 6428B. See Marc Finer, A Summary of the Key Individual and 
Business Tax Provisions of the American Rescue Plan Act, JDSUPRA (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-summary-of-the-key-individual-and-1641542/ 
(“The payments are phased out for single filers with adjusted gross incomes between 
$75,000 and $80,000 (between $150,000 and $160,000 for married persons filing 
jointly).”). 
 116 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9013 (amending Section 2104(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the CARES Act (15 
U.S.C. 9023(b)(3)(A)(ii)) to extend these additional unemployment benefits until September 
6, 2021). 
 117 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9662 (modifying tax credits for qualifying health insurance cov-
erage). 
 118 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9611(a)(i)(3) (increasing child tax credits for 2021). 
 119 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9611(a)(i)(1) (providing for refundable tax credit). 
 120 Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 7527A (providing for periodic payment of credit). 
 121 Thomas Kaplan, What’s in the Stimulus Bill? A Guide to Where the $1.9 Trillion Is 
Going, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/07/us/politics/whats-in-the-stimulus-
bill.html (updated Mar. 17, 2021). 
 122 See Annie Lowrey, Stockton’s Basic-Income Experiment Pays Off, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/stocktons-basic-income-experi-
ment-pays-off/618174/ (describing study of impact of Stockton, California, pilot); Shirley 
Leung, Chelsea Is About to Become the Country’s Biggest Experiment in Giving out No-
strings-attached Checks, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 17, 2020), https://www.bos-
tonglobe.com/2020/10/17/business/chelsea-is-about-become-countrys-biggest-experiment-
giving-out-no-strings-attached-checks/ (reporting on announcement of Chelsea, Massachu-
setts pilot). 
 123 Lowrey, supra note 122. 
 124 Id. 
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In addition, the payments to Stockton families did not discourage work.125 In 
November 2020, Chelsea used money from a foundation to begin giving about 
2,000 low-income families $200 to $400 a month, money that can be used for 
anything from food to paying bills.126 These demonstration projects promise to 
provide concrete evidence about the efficacy of measures to increase the incomes 
of low-income families.127 The results may also dispel concerns about whether 
providing cash assistance with no strings attached will discourage work partici-
pation, an objection frequently raised to traditional welfare and cash support pro-
grams. 
During the Great Recession of 2008, Rahm Emanuel, then Chief of Staff to 
former President Obama, borrowed an expression credited to Sir Winston Church-
ill to spur innovative responses: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”128 The 
United States needs to accept that challenge now.   
The social insurance infrastructure of the country needs to be augmented to 
meet the risks that the contemporary economy and the threat of pandemics and 
environmental disaster pose. In early March 2020, I attended the annual policy 
conference of the National Academy of Social Insurance (the Academy)—the last 
trip I took by plane before the pandemic—the centerpiece of which was the re-
lease of a report examining approaches for using Medicare to expand health in-
surance coverage.129 The American Rescue Act provisions that subsidize the cost 
of private insurance and that provide incentives to states that have not yet adopted 
the Medicaid expansion have the potential to advance the goal of universal cov-
erage. Recently, the Academy released the preliminary working paper examining 
ways to use the social insurance and public benefits infrastructures to ensure that 
all individuals and families in the United States have sustainable levels of in-
come.130 Provisions in the American Rescue Act that expand support to families 
with children, albeit temporary, represent progress along that path. Finally, the 
enhancements to the unemployment insurance system in the American Rescue 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Leung, supra note 122. 
 127 Lowrey, supra note 122 (observing that “[t]he best way to get people out of poverty is 
just to get them out of poverty; the best way to offer families more resources is just to offer 
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the concept of guaranteed incomes and the proposal by Senator Mitt Romney, a Republican 
from Utah, to replace the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program with a child al-
lowance. 
 128 Never Waste a Good Crisis, KLOUDLEARN (Apr. 27, 2020), https://kloudlearn.me-
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 130 Assured Income for the 21st Century, NAT’L. ACAD. SOC. INS. (2021), https://se-
cure.nasi.org/assured-income/. 
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Act recognize that the fortunes of workers who become unemployed due to a pan-
demic, a natural disaster, or some other circumstance out of their control should 
not rest with uneven systems operated by states.131 
The American Rescue Act represents a down payment on future reforms and 
must not be the last word.132 Thank you, again, for this opportunity to participate 
in this important symposium. 
 
 
 131 The National Academy of Social Insurance’s Unemployment Insurance Task Force is 
examining options for reform of this key support for vulnerable workers. See Elaine Weiss, 
Initial Meetings of Unemployment Insurance Task Force Highlight Concerns About the Dis-
proportionate Share of Women and Workers of Color in Precarious Jobs, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. 
INS. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.nasi.org/discuss/2021/02/initial-meetings-unemployment-
insurance-task-force-highlight. 
 132 The National Academy of Social Insurance has launched a Task Force on the potential 
impacts of COVID-19 on the population, the economy, and social insurance in the United 
States recognizing that the current crisis is unlikely to be the last. See also William Rodgers, 
III & Renée M. Landers, American Rescue Plan Strengthens the Nation’s Social Insurance 
System, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://secure.nasi.org/civicrm?civiwp=Civi-
CRM&q=civicrm%2Fmailing%2Fview&reset=1&id=4128. 
